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KICKING AND SCREAMING: DRAGGING
NORTH CAROLINA’S DIRECT
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*
“[I]n the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose state
constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim
against the State under [the North Carolina] Constitution.”
Corum v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d
276, 289 (1992). “[T]o be considered adequate in redressing a
constitutional wrong, a plaintiff must have at least the
opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.”
Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 339–40,
678 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009). . . . However, if the Court rules in
favor of Defendants on the statute of repose issue, then Plaintiff
would not be able to bring any state-law claim, and would not
have an “adequate state remedy” for his state constitutional
rights.1
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1. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 22–23, Grimes v. City of Hickory, No. 5:14-CV-00160-RLV (W.D.N.C.
Feb. 17, 2016), ECF No. 76 [hereinafter Grimes Mem. in Opp’n].
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INTRODUCTION
Provisions of the North Carolina Constitution are “selfexecuting,” meaning they “neither require[] any law for [their]
enforcement, nor [are they] susceptible of impairment by
legislation.”2 The constitution guarantees, at minimum, that litigants
must have an opportunity to bring a claim directly under the
constitution for constitutional violations.3 Specifically, a doctrine of
case law has developed in North Carolina that provides plaintiffs with
broader claims when proceeding against the government than
otherwise would be available under North Carolina statutes.4 When
plaintiffs would otherwise be without a statutory or common law
claim, the doctrine announced in Corum v. University of North
Carolina gives plaintiffs the right to proceed directly under the North
Carolina Constitution.5
While the scope of this right has ebbed and flowed over past
decades, it reached its nadir in 2009 when the Supreme Court of
North Carolina recognized that regardless of certain immunities and
defenses raised by the state, “a plaintiff must have at least the
opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.”6
This is perhaps the broadest language the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has used in guaranteeing plaintiffs a right to bring claims
2. Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 242 N.C. 612, 617, 89 S.E.2d 290,
295 (1955). Provisions of the North Carolina Constitution that have been specifically held
to be self-executing include: (1) the protection of freedom of speech, State v. Petersilie,
334 N.C. 169, 184, 432 S.E.2d 832, 840–41 (1993), (2) the exemption from taxation of
municipal property, In re Univ. of N.C., 300 N.C. 563, 570, 268 S.E.2d 472, 477 (1980), and
(3) the prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362,
372, 163 S.E.2d 363, 371 (1968).
3. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 985 (1992). As a general principle, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects
the state from suit—courts can only hear claims against the state when the state has
authorized it to do so, which is usually done through an enabling statute. Whitfield v.
Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 41–42, 497 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1998) (“It has long been the established
law of North Carolina that the State cannot be sued except with its consent or upon its
waiver of immunity.”); see also Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 309, 222 S.E.2d 412, 417
(1976) (“The doctrine of [sovereign immunity] has proscribed both contract and tort
actions against the state and its administrative agencies.”); News & Observer Publ’g Co. v.
McCrory, __ N.C. App. __, __, 795 S.E.2d 243, 248–53 (2016) (explaining sovereign
immunity further); Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages
for Violation of Provisions of State Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619, 623–29 (2000)
(collecting similar cases in other states “where there exists no direct enabling statute”).
4. Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 289–90.
5. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
6. Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340, 678
S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009).
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directly under the North Carolina Constitution. Nevertheless, a threat
has loomed over this right in recent years, not by any action of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, but instead by its very inaction. A
lack of clarity in the doctrinal underpinnings has meant that courts,
both state and federal, have struggled with providing the rights
plaintiffs have ostensibly been guaranteed.7 Consider, for example,
the hypothetical plaintiff who feels that his or her constitutional rights
have been violated by a state actor, yet his or her claim could be
barred by a statute of limitations. As will be explained,8 it is currently
unclear whether that plaintiff may bring a direct constitutional claim.9
This lack of clarity has led judges to decide such questions on other
grounds, rather than wading into the tricky questions of state
constitutional law.10
Plaintiffs have sought to use the potentially broad scope of this
right by seeking to overcome numerous defenses and immunities
through the invocation of their right to “enter the courthouse doors
and present [their] claim[s].”11 All the while, the lack of guidance on
such issues has led to few decisions and the limited development of a
body of case law. Over the past decade, direct constitutional claims
have withered on the vine, rarely being given thorough attention by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.12
7. Infra Section I.D & Part II.
8. Infra Part II.
9. As used in this Comment, “direct constitutional claim” refers to a claim brought
by a plaintiff directly under a constitutional provision and not under any statutory or
common law cause of action. For example, in the federal arena, a direct constitutional
claim would be brought alleging violations of constitutional provisions, as opposed to a
statutory claim granting a cause of action for such violations.
10. See infra note 109 and accompanying text; see also Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C.
415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (per curiam) (highlighting the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance).
11. Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355; see also Grimes Mem. in Opp’n, supra
note 1, at 22–23 (seeking to overcome the statute of repose with reference to the rights
established in Craig and Corum); Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 18, Randleman v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cv-159-TDS (M.D.N.C. May 21,
2015) (seeking to overcome waiver of common law claims); Perry v. Pamlico County, 88 F.
Supp. 3d 518, 535–36 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (discussing public official immunity in light of Craig
and Corum); Corum, 330 N.C. at 785–86, 413 S.E.2d at 291 (stating that sovereign
immunity “cannot stand as a barrier to North Carolina citizens who seek to remedy
violations of their rights”).
12. Craig, a seminal case, was decided in 2009. 363 N.C. at 334, 678 S.E.2d at 351.
Since then, this doctrine has been addressed by members of the supreme court just twice:
once in a terse majority opinion, Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 788–89, 688 S.E.2d
426, 428–29 (2010), and once in a concurring opinion, Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C.
126, 138–41, 794 S.E.2d 710, 719–20 (2016) (Ervin, J., concurring in the result). While a
majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not recently addressed this issue,
Corum claims have continued to see lively debate in federal courts and in the North
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This Comment argues that judicial action is necessary to protect
direct constitutional claims for the twenty-first century. North
Carolina would not be alone in doing so; courts across the country
have proven an effective means of protecting constitutional rights,
unafraid even to go so far as sanctioning other branches of
government, and in doing so, making clear their disdain for such
violations.13 Clarifying constitutional rights would protect those rights
while remaining well within the traditional province of the courts.14
Additionally, this Comment seeks to identify the bounds of the
right of an individual to enforce the North Carolina Constitution.
First, Part I traces the development of the so-called “Corum claim,”
from its origin to its expansion in an attempt to define the modern
Corum doctrine. A robust understanding of the current status and
contours of this doctrine must be developed before being able to fully
address the need for further doctrinal development.15 Then,
considering a recent claim that Corum can be used to overcome
North Carolina’s statute of repose, Part II analyzes the strength of the
Corum claim against other similar doctrines. Finally, Part III argues
that the time has come for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to
readdress the right to bring claims directly under the North Carolina
Constitution and suggests contours that the court should consider.
I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECT CLAIMS UNDER NORTH
CAROLINA’S CONSTITUTION
A. Using the North Carolina Constitution for Jurisdiction
In analyzing direct constitutional claims in North Carolina, it is
first necessary to trace the development of the body of case law
Carolina Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, No. 1:12-cv-333, 2017
WL 680434, at *12, *13 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1374 (4th Cir.
Mar. 24, 2017); Davis v. Blanchard, 175 F. Supp. 3d 581, 588–92 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Wilkie
v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, __ N.C. App. __, __, 796 S.E.2d 57, 63–64 (2016); Hubbard
v. N.C. State Univ., __ N.C. App. __, __, 789 S.E.2d 915, 923 (2016).
13. See, e.g., Order at 5–7, Covington v. North Carolina, No. 1:15-CV-399 (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 29, 2016), ECF No. 140 (ordering North Carolina’s General Assembly to hold a
special session for the purpose of redistricting state legislative districts), stay granted
pending cert., 508 U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 808 (Jan. 10, 2017). Another example of this involves
the Supreme Court of Washington, which has gone so far as to sanction the State of
Washington $100,000 per day for failure to comply with a Washington constitutional
provision. Order at 13, McCleary v. Washington, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Oct. 6, 2016).
14. See infra Part III.
15. While subsequent cases have built upon the contours of the law announced in
Corum, for the sake of clarity, this Comment will refer to the doctrine as the Corum
doctrine.
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surrounding such claims. The Supreme Court of North Carolina was
in a unique situation in the 1950s. In 1955, Fred Sale and others
commenced a proceeding against the North Carolina Highway
Commission (“Commission”) under a statutory provision allowing for
suit against the state.16 They sought to recover money they were
allegedly owed for granting the Commission an easement for
construction of a bridge over the French Broad River in Asheville
and damages stemming from a fire caused by a Commission
subcontractor.17 This was not the first time these parties would appear
before the supreme court. In 1953, the court dismissed their first suit
but instructed the plaintiffs that they could recover damages if they
proved that the Commission’s behavior was negligent and caused the
injury.18 By the time 1955 came around, the plaintiffs had done just
that,19 yet the Commission claimed that the court lacked
jurisdiction—that there was, in fact, no statutory jurisdiction over
state agencies for negligence or breach of contract claims.20
What would become an important doctrine of North Carolina
constitutional law thus began, in essence, by accident. The supreme
court told Sale to come back if he could prove negligence, which is
exactly what he did. The court then held that he was entitled to
damages,21 yet there was no statute on the books that would afford
16. Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 242 N.C. 612, 613, 89 S.E.2d 290,
292 (1955) (“This is a special proceeding instituted . . . under the authority of G.S. § 136-19
and G.S. § 40-12 et seq . . . .”).
17. Id. at 613–15, 89 S.E.2d at 292–94.
18. Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 238 N.C. 599, 606, 78 S.E.2d 724,
729 (1953).
19. Sale, 242 N.C. at 620–22, 89 S.E.2d at 297–99. In the first suit, Sale and others
based their claim in a contract and right-of-way agreement executed between them, as
landowners, and the Commission. Sale, 238 N.C. at 602–03, 78 S.E.2d at 727. The plaintiffs
alleged that the Commission negligently caused a structure fire on the land and failed to
perform certain building and rebuilding obligations. Id. at 606, 78 S.E.2d at 729. However,
the court found that none of these allegations were actually based in the contract;
therefore, because “[t]he proof materially depart[ed] from the allegations,” the court held
that the plaintiffs could not recover until they “d[id] so on the case set up in their
complaint.” Id. In the second suit, the plaintiffs based their theory in a takings claim under
the North Carolina Constitution, alleging that failure of the Commission to remediate the
property damage constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property. Sale, 242 N.C. at
620, 89 S.E.2d at 297. Because the action was therefore no longer based in the contract,
the plaintiffs were ultimately able to recover. Id. at 620–22, 89 S.E.2d 297–99; see also John
D. Boutwell, Note, The Cause of Action for Damages Under North Carolina’s Constitution:
Corum v. University of North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1899, 1906 (1992) (discussing the
facts and law of Sale).
20. Sale, 242 N.C. at 616, 89 S.E.2d at 294.
21. Id. at 620–21, 89 S.E.2d at 297–98; see also 1A CHRISTINE M. G. DAVIS ET AL,
STRONG’S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX § 561 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the “law of the case
doctrine” in North Carolina).
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jurisdiction over the Commission.22 In an effort to extricate itself from
this awkward position, the supreme court announced a new principle:
that the constitution “forbids damage to private property” and that
such a provision is “self-executing.”23 As a result, while the
Commission was correct that there was no jurisdiction under the
applicable statute, the plaintiffs were still allowed to bring the action
under the common law.24
Nearly a decade later, in a separate case, the Commission came
before the Supreme Court of North Carolina again in Midgett v.
North Carolina State Highway Commission,25 this time arguing that
according to a North Carolina statute, claims alleging takings by the
Commission must be heard in administrative proceedings.26 In this
new case, the Commission had not taken Midgett’s property, as had
been the case with the plaintiffs in Sale; instead, its construction on
neighboring properties had led to floodwaters being rerouted, which
in turn, had damaged Midgett’s property.27 The factual differences
between Midgett and Sale as well as the substantive law regarding
floodwaters is largely irrelevant for this Comment; what is important
is Midgett’s right to relief. Typically, the procedure for adjudicating
the proper value of compensation owed for takings was a statutory
administrative proceeding,28 but such proceedings were unavailable to
neighboring landowners.29 Therefore, Midgett had ostensibly suffered
a taking but had no statutory recourse against the Commission.30 In
response, the court built upon the law as stated in Sale by holding that
article I, section 17 of the North Carolina Constitution31 was not only
self-executing, but that it also “neither requires any law for its
enforcement nor is [it] susceptible of impairment by legislation.”32
Whereas Sale held only that the plaintiffs could proceed under the

22. Sale, 242 N.C. at 621–22, 89 S.E.2d at 298.
23. Id. at 618, 89 S.E.2d at 296 (citing Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 52 S.E.
821, 824 (Va. 1906)).
24. Id. at 621–22, 89 S.E.2d at 298.
25. 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Lea Co. v. N.C.
Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 615, 304 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1983).
26. Id. at 243, 132 S.E.2d at 603 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1959)).
27. Id. at 242–43, 132 S.E.2d at 632.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 248–51, 134 S.E.2d at 606–09.
30. See id. at 251, 134 S.E.2d at 608.
31. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 17. The North Carolina Constitution has been
revised and amended multiple times since its original ratification, most recently in 1970.
JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION
4, 19, 32–33 (2d ed. 2013).
32. Midgett, 260 N.C. at 250, 132 S.E.2d at 608.
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constitution,33 Midgett went further in stating that such a right could
not be “impair[ed]” by the legislature. As the Midgett court put it,
“[W]here the Constitution points out no remedy and no statute
affords an adequate remedy . . . the common law will furnish the
appropriate action for adequate redress of such grievance[s].”34
The doctrine of Corum claims thus got off to a somewhat
inauspicious start; it is not by coincidence that these claims are not
called Sale or Midgett claims. In Sale, the supreme court backed itself
into a corner and subsequently implied a common law constitutional
claim against the state but only on a specific fact pattern. Dealing with
the same constitutional provision, Midgett, on one hand reaffirmed
Sale, and on the other, expanded it by applying the Sale reasoning
beyond a specific fact pattern. On the surface, Sale and Midgett were
just two jurisdictional cases; yet on a macro level, the court simply
refused to dismiss two compelling claims against the state. For nearly
three decades, these cases remained oddities. While both were cited
as important cases within the realms of the substantive law they dealt
with,35 the concept of direct constitutional claims under the North
Carolina Constitution lay dormant until 1992.
B.

Corum v. University of North Carolina

In the 1980s, Dr. Alvis Corum was responsible for overseeing the
Appalachian Collection, a collection of artifacts important to North
Carolina’s history, housed at the library of Appalachian State
University.36 After Dr. Corum expressed his disagreement with the
decision of school administrators to divide the collection among
libraries in the University of North Carolina system, he was removed
from his deanship.37 He subsequently brought state and federal
constitutional claims for violations of his free speech rights.38 After
33. 242 N.C. 612, 618, 89 S.E.2d 290, 296 (1955).
34. 260 N.C. at 250, 132 S.E.2d at 608.
35. See, e.g., Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 375, 384 S.E.2d 8, 28 (1989)
(Martin, J., concurring) (citing Sale as a loss-of-property-by-fire case); Olan Mills v.
Cannon Aircraft Exec. Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 525, 160 S.E.2d 735, 741 (1968)
(applying the Midgett definition of an “act of God”).
36. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 767, 413 S.E.2d 276, 280–81 (1992).
Appalachian State is a part of the University of North Carolina system, About
Appalachian State University, APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY (2016),
http://www.appstate.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/9EQU-MB24], which is a state
incorporated public agency, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-1 (1971). For further discussion of the
facts surrounding Corum, see generally Boutwell, supra note 19.
37. Corum, 330 N.C. at 769, 413 S.E.2d at 282.
38. Id. at 770, 413 S.E.2d at 282. Dr. Corum’s federal claims were brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
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upholding the grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the
federal claims,39 the supreme court turned to the direct state
constitutional claims and looked to cases that were nearly thirty years
old, heralding the return of Midgett and Sale. In doing so, Corum
would become the paragon of a line of cases protecting constitutional
remedies.40
The Corum court did two things: it created a remedy and it
limited sovereign immunity. First, by relying on Midgett and Sale, the
court held that in the absence of “adequate” state remedies, plaintiffs
have a direct claim against the State for abridgements of
constitutional rights.41 It based this holding both in the text and in the
history of the North Carolina Constitution, as well as in the inherent
power of the judiciary.42 While leaving the exact relief to the
discretion of the trial court, the supreme court recognized that this
judicially created remedy must bow to established claims where they
already existed, and that lower courts should seek the “least intrusive
remedy available.”43 Whereas Midgett and Sale created direct claims
for violations of one specific constitutional provision,44 Corum
ostensibly allowed claims for violations of any constitutional
provision, or at the very least, for violations of constitutional rights

the U.S. Constitution. Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court
properly concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity against these
federal claims. Id. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
39. Id.
40. Cf. Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution: Prospects for Damages Suits Under the
New Mexico Bill of Rights, 25 N.M. L. REV. 173, 186 n.118 (1995) (noting the “strong
independent line of state cases” leading up to Corum).
41. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. Confusingly, the court seemed to hold
that direct claims were available for any constitutional infringements, yet in the same
paragraph, it also held that the freedom of speech provision in the constitution is selfexecuting. Id. It is therefore unclear what, if anything, it means for a constitutional
provision to be “self-executing” after Corum. Subsequent cases have not clarified this
issue.
42. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (explaining that as “the ultimate interpreter of our
State Constitution,” the court is bound only to apply the common law and acts of the
legislature that are “consistent with the Constitution”).
43. Id. at 784–85, 413 S.E.2d 290–91. Unfortunately, what constitutes the “least
intrusive remedy available” has seen only limited development in the case law. For the
purposes of illustration, however, in 2002 the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled a
state legislative redistricting scheme unconstitutional and imposed a standard to be used
by the General Assembly in drawing up new districts. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 335 N.C.
354, 388, 562 S.E.2d 377, 401 (2002) (Orr, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
his dissent, Justice Butterfield argued that the imposition of specific criteria constituted an
“encroachment” beyond the “least intrusive remedy available.” Id. at 419, 562 S.E.2d at
419 (Butterfield, J., dissenting).
44. See supra Section I.A.
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generally.45 By allowing for these claims, Corum allowed plaintiffs
broader opportunities for recovery. A plaintiff whose cause of action
does not fall under a statutory or common law cause of action would
have been without any opportunity for recovery before Corum—
there would have been no cause of action under which to bring suit.
However, Corum served to broaden the availability of direct
constitutional claims46: even without a statutory or common law cause
of action, a plaintiff can bring a cause of action specifically under a
constitutional provision alleging violations of that provision.
Second, the Corum court addressed how this newly fashioned
remedy interacted with the doctrine of sovereign immunity.47 Absent
statutory authorization for suit against the state, sovereign immunity
would generally prevent suit against the state.48 As announced in
Corum, direct constitutional claims in North Carolina can only be
brought when there is no established statutory claim or remedy.49
Therefore, if the Corum court had not addressed the interaction
between direct constitutional claims, the opening up of direct
constitutional claims would have been meaningless: direct
constitutional claims can only occur when there is no statutory
authorization for suit, but if there is no statutory authorization for
suit, the claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The court therefore
was required to “resolve[] the paradox between constitutional torts
and sovereign immunity.”50 Sovereign immunity, the court stated, is a
common law theory, while the rights to recovery are constitutional
rights.51 As a result, “when there is a clash between these
constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights
must prevail.”52 Because sovereign immunity would preclude
common law claims and there were no statutory claims Dr. Corum
could proceed under, Dr. Corum could proceed directly under the
North Carolina Constitution.53 Having thus established a new
45. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782–83, 413 S.E.2d at 289–90.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 785–86, 413 S.E.2d at 291–91.
48. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
49. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782–83, 413 S.E.2d at 290–91.
50. T. Hunter Jefferson, Note, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles:
The Case for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State
Governments, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1542–43 (1997).
51. Corum, 330 N.C. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291–92; see also Moffitt v. City of Asheville,
103 N.C. 237, 258, 9 S.E. 695, 698 (1889) (adopting the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
North Carolina by stating that “[c]ounties are never answerable in damages for torts,
unless made so by the provisions of some statute”).
52. Corum, 330 N.C at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292.
53. Id.
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constitutional claim, the court explicitly decided that at least one wellknown doctrine—sovereign immunity—cannot “stand as a barrier” to
those vitally important constitutional claims.54
Corum is thus notable both for what it did and what it did not
do.55 In one fell swoop, the supreme court greatly expanded potential
claims for plaintiffs to bring.56 Yet these claims are not unfettered—
direct claims can only be brought “in the absence of an adequate state
remedy.”57 This is a logical limitation; for when there is already a
statute enabling claims against the state, plaintiffs are required to take
advantage of that statute.58 Nevertheless, the Corum court left
undefined what exactly would constitute an “adequate” remedy.59
In particular, the court did not explain the role of shielding
doctrines in evaluating the adequacy of a remedy. When the doctrine
of sovereign immunity bars suit, it appears that such a bar against
litigation will constitute an inadequate remedy.60 Therefore, in Corum
claims, while defendants may attempt to invoke sovereign immunity,
they will likely be unsuccessful. As the Corum court said, sovereign

54. Id. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291–92.
55. It should be noted that some have read Corum as simply a federal Bivens claim
extended to the state. See Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing Failure-to-Protect
Claims Under State Constitutions Via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1294, 1326 n.187 (2010); see also Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (declining to
extend a Bivens action to the Eighth Amendment when there is an “adequate alternative
[state law] damages action”); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment implies a cause
of action for damages arising out of conduct by federal officials in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
56. It is worth briefly discussing statutory remedies for violations of constitutional
rights. At the federal level, there is a statutory claim to recover for any deprivation of
federal constitutional rights by state officers acting under the color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012). However, qualified immunity is sometimes available to public officials accused of
§ 1983 violations. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (holding that
qualified immunity will apply to an official’s conduct unless that conduct violated a
“clearly established” constitutional right). While North Carolina does have a civil rights
statute, it is much more limited in scope than its federal counterpart. Compare N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 99D-1 (2016), with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (North Carolina’s civil rights statute
requires a conspiracy of two or more persons and the use of force or threats of force, while
the federal statute merely requires a deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or
immunities”).
57. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291 (“It would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on
the one hand that citizens have constitutional individual civil rights that are protected
from encroachment actions by the State, while on the other hand saying that individuals
whose constitutional rights have been violated by the State cannot sue because of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.”).
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immunity cannot “stand as a barrier” to direct constitutional claims.61
Nevertheless, while defendants are still “entitled to all defenses that
may arise,”62 the court left open the question of what those defenses
might be. Essentially, outside of sovereign immunity, it is still unclear
how other substantive bars to litigation, such as qualified immunity or
statutes of repose, interact with these Corum claims. Moreover, the
question remains of whether the existence of a federal remedy
constitutes an adequate remedy under Corum’s analysis. In this way,
Corum perhaps raised just as many questions as it answered.
Corum not only recognized new claims, it also held that a long
standing doctrine such as sovereign immunity could not protect the
state against these claims.63 For this reason, it is perhaps not
surprising that just eight months later, retired Associate Justice Harry
Martin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina penned an essay
identifying Corum as part of a wave of cases which put North
Carolina “at the head of the movement to energize state
constitutional law.”64 As he noted, “[t]he North Carolina Supreme
Court’s willingness to infer a remedy directly from the state
constitution stands in sharp contrast to the recent constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, which ha[d]
curtailed dramatically the availability of damage actions directly
under the Federal Constitution.”65 It is worth situating Corum in time.
Starting in the 1970s, scholars, including Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan, began calling for state courts to strengthen
constitutional rights in reaction to United States Supreme Court
decisions weakening such protections in the Federal Constitution.66
By 1992, when Corum was decided, a strong wave of “independent

61. Id. at 785, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
62. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 292.
63. Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291–92.
64. Harry C. Martin, The State as a “Font of Individual Liberties”: North Carolina
Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1751, 1756–57 (1992).
65. Id. at 1757.
66. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); see also Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A
Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793, 809 (2000)
(“At that point, state courts around the country began to question the assumption that
parallel state and federal constitutional provisions must have identical meaning.”).
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constitutional judgments”67 began to heed the call for strengthened
state constitutional rights.68
C.

Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover County Board of Education

Nearly two decades after Corum was decided, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina revisited it in Craig v. New Hanover County
Board of Education.69 In Craig, a mentally disabled student brought
suit against his school district for negligence in failing to adequately
protect him from sexual assault.70 Additionally, he claimed “that the
Board deprived him of an education free from harm and
psychological abuse, thereby violating three separate provisions of the
North Carolina State Constitution.”71 On the surface, both the
question presented to the court and the opinion it rendered were
relatively straightforward. The court was asked to determine
“whether plaintiff’s common law negligence claim, which will
ultimately be defeated by governmental immunity . . . provides an
adequate remedy at state law.”72 More subtly, however, the case also
presented two different questions. First, whether common law
negligence is an adequate remedy; and second, whether governmental
immunity would render that remedy inadequate.73 The apparent
holding of Craig is straight Corum doctrine: because sovereign
immunity would bar the plaintiff’s common law negligence claim, he
can instead bring claims directly under the state constitution.74
However, there are two parts of the Craig decision that muddy the
waters.

67. Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1803, 1806 (1992).
68. Id. at 1803 (“The flow of state constitutional law these days comes at a time when
judicial protection of individual liberties under the Federal Constitution is unmistakably
ebbing. No one should think the two phenomena are unrelated.”).
69. 363 N.C. 334, 678 S.E.2d 351 (2009).
70. Id. at 335–36, 678 S.E.2d at 352–53.
71. Id. at 335, 678 S.E.2d at 352 (citing N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 19; id. art. IX, § 1).
72. Id. While this case was the first to assess the availability of an adequate state
remedy in light of governmental immunity, the distinction between sovereign immunity
and governmental immunity “is immaterial.” Id. at 335 n.3, 678 S.E.2d at 353 n.3.
Sovereign immunity “applies to the State and its agencies,” id., while governmental
immunity applies to counties and their agencies, Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104, 489
S.E.2d 880, 884 (1997). Governmental immunity, like sovereign immunity, is different
from some affirmative defenses in that “it shields a defendant entirely from having to
answer for its conduct at all in a civil suit for damages.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 337, 678 S.E.2d
at 354. Consequently, it would not be unreasonable to question Craig’s significance, if any,
within the broader doctrinal development.
73. Craig, 363 N.C. at 336, 678 S.E.2d at 353.
74. Id. at 338, 678 S.E.2d at 354.
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First, the Craig court stated that “to be considered adequate in
redressing a constitutional wrong, a plaintiff must have at least the
opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.”75
Read in context, the court’s statement appears to mean that a
defense, such as governmental immunity, cannot prevent plaintiffs
from redressing constitutional wrongs.76 What is unclear, however, is
how far such a statement extends and, specifically, whether it extends
to doctrines such as immunities, time bars, doctrines of finality, or
procedural requirements.77 The court did not clearly elaborate on
whether the guarantee of the opportunity to present a claim would
overcome these various barriers to litigation. Consequently, the scope
of this statement is ambiguous. Absent further clarification, the
court’s statement that “a plaintiff must have at least the opportunity
to enter the courthouse doors”78 could make way for a new breed of
claims—claims otherwise barred by numerous defenses and
procedural hurdles, but now given new life under Corum.
In the next paragraph, the court attempted to limit the scope of
its previous sentence. “This holding,” it said, “does not predetermine
the likelihood that plaintiff will win other pretrial motions, defeat
affirmative defenses, or ultimately succeed on the merits.”79 This
statement seems to make clear that an adequate remedy is not
rendered inadequate by such defenses. Nevertheless, the opinion
reaffirmed the need for an adequate remedy that “provid[es] the
possibility of relief under the circumstances.”80 Does being timebarred by a statute of repose preclude the possibility of relief?81 What
about qualified immunity?82 In Craig, a direct constitutional claim was
75. Id. at 339–40, 678 S.E.2d at 355.
76. As subsequently explained by the court, an adequate defense cannot “stand[] as
an absolute bar” to a plaintiff’s common law cause of action.” Id. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355.
77. This ambiguity arises from the language of the Craig opinion. The guarantee of
access to the courthouse is not on its face limited to a specific scenario. Id. However, the
next sentence of the opinion applies the guarantee to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
What is unclear is whether the application of the “opportunity to enter the courthouse,”
id., is limited to overcoming sovereign immunity or exemplified by overcoming sovereign
immunity. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. As noted several years later by the same court, “[s]tatutes of repose function as
‘unyielding and absolute barriers’ to litigation.” Christie v. Hartley Const., Inc., 367 N.C.
534, 539, 766 S.E.2d 283, 287 (2014) (quoting Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 633, 325
S.E.2d 469, 475 (1985)).
82. While the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that “[q]ualified immunity is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.
Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
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allowed because Craig’s claim was precluded by governmental
immunity, “regardless of his ability to prove his case.”83 What was left
unclear, however, is whether any other procedural bar or well-pled
defense would be treated differently.
The second unclear portion of the Craig opinion is presented in
the following quotation:
[T]he facts presented [in Craig] are distinguishable from a case
in which a plaintiff has lost his ability to pursue a common law
claim due to expiration of the statute of limitations, for
example. Sovereign immunity entirely precludes this plaintiff
from moving forward with his common law claim; without being
permitted to pursue his direct colorable constitutional claims,
he will be left with no remedy for his alleged constitutional
injuries.84
There is a strong argument to be made that this statement is
largely dicta,85 since the statute of limitations was simply not at issue
in Craig. It is, in fact, discussed nowhere else in the opinion. It was
similarly not discussed in the opinion of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals86 or in the order of the superior court.87 While perhaps an
illustrative example, this first statement as to statutes of limitations
should therefore not be read as binding precedent. Even if this
language were not dicta, it still misses the main point. While the
operation of sovereign immunity and a statute of limitations may be
different, they are not so readily distinguishable. Both preclude a
plaintiff from moving forward with claims, and both can leave the
plaintiff, absent direct constitutional claims, without remedies. As will
be seen below, however, this language still raises questions for new
plaintiffs attempting to invoke their Corum and Craig rights.

223, 231 (2009)), and thus presumably would preclude the possibility of relief under North
Carolina law, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not yet squarely addressed this
issue.
83. Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355.
84. Id. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355–56.
85. Cf. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 226 (2016) (“Judicial dictum is a statement the court
expressly uses to guide parties in their future conduct . . . . [A] court is not bound to follow
dicta in a prior case that did not fully debate the point currently at issue.”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also id. § 224 (discussing the persuasive force of dicta).
86. See Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 651–57,
648 S.E.2d 923, 923–27 (2007).
87. See Order, Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 06 CVS
4033, 2006 WL 4386451 (N.C. Super. Dec. 15, 2006).
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D. Recent Developments in the Corum Doctrine
Despite these lingering questions, the Corum doctrine has
enjoyed application and consideration in both the North Carolina
state courts and the federal court system.88 For example, in 2012, in
Wilcox v. City of Asheville,89 a panel of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals focused on the distinction between possible and impossible
relief discussed in Craig.90 Craig, the Wilcox court said, focused on the
“absolute bar” created by sovereign immunity which makes relief
“impossible.”91 The panel further seemed to recognize a dichotomy
between the adequateness of factual and legal conclusions: claims
barred as a matter of law would render a remedy inadequate, the
opinion suggests, while claims that could or could not fail based on
defenses presented at trial would be considered adequate.92
But this dichotomy blurs the analysis presented in Craig. For
example, under this analytical structure, a direct constitutional claim
could be brought when there is no material issue of fact as to a
defendant’s role as a government official at the time of the events
giving rise to the claim. In this scenario, a defendant would either be
protected as a matter of law by governmental immunity or not.
Logically, such a case should not be different from a separate case in
which the question of whether a defendant was a government official
to be covered by governmental immunity at the time of the events is a
factual determination for trial. The legal operation of governmental
immunity is the same in both scenarios; yet based on the Wilcox
panel’s analysis, the debate over the direct constitutional claim would
turn out very differently.
A few years after Wilcox, a separate panel of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals interpreted Craig yet again in Delgado v. Petruck.93
While the question presented was not one of direct constitutional
claims, this unpublished decision is noteworthy in how it interpreted
Craig.94 The court of appeals read Craig as differentiating statutory
grants of immunity, such as immunity granted by the legislature to
those who report crime or abuse,95 from common law immunity

88. For more discussion of federal cases, see infra Part II.
89. 222 N.C. App. 285, 730 S.E.2d 226 (2012).
90. Id. at 299–301, 730 S.E.2d at 236–38.
91. Id. at 300, 730 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340–41, 678 S.E.2d 351, 355–56 (2009)).
92. Id. at 299, 730 S.E.2d at 237.
93. No. COA15-34, 2015 WL 5834278 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-309 (2015)).
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doctrines, such as governmental immunity.96 As the question of
immunities has become more relevant when analyzing direct
constitutional claims,97 the fact that one appellate panel has
interpreted Craig as strictly differentiating between statutory and
common law defenses and immunities might become important as the
doctrine progresses. Delgado shows that the court of appeals is still
attempting to find practical ways to apply Craig, even if it is unwilling
to go so far as to publish an opinion on the matter.
From these cases, it is clear that North Carolina has developed a
doctrine that allows for direct constitutional claims. As has been
shown, this doctrine emerged from what looked like a judicial fluke
into a powerful body of law, ultimately allowing plaintiffs to
overcome various well-established defenses in an effort to protect
their constitutional rights. While North Carolina courts have shown
no signs of retreating from Corum and Craig, many unanswered
questions still linger and deserve further exploration.
II. CORUM VERSUS ALREADY-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES
This doctrine of case law, from Sale to Craig, has the potential to
vastly expand constitutional claims brought in North Carolina courts.
The effect of these decisions “could sweep [in] . . . an unlimited host
of court-construed individual rights which may fall under Corum’s
umbrella of protection.”98 If Corum was a “call to arms,”99 and Craig
extended that call, the question for today’s jurisprudence is the status
of the Corum doctrine. The potential scope of this doctrine will
become clearer through an analysis of novel attempts to use these
cases to overcome a variety of substantive and procedural obstacles to
such claims.
Before discussing the development of the applicability of
defenses to Corum and Craig claims, it should first be noted that,
contrary to what will be discussed below, there has been at least one
case where similar questions have been posed and where federal
district court judges have rendered clear decisions.100 Notably, these
holdings do not have precedential effect on state courts101 and do not

96. Id.
97. See supra Section I.C.
98. Boutwell, supra note 19, at 1913–14.
99. Id. at 1915.
100. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Good, No. Civ. 4:98CV233, 1999 WL 33320960, at *6–7
(W.D.N.C. July 29, 1999).
101. See Time Warner Entm’t–Advance/Newhouse P’ship v. Carteret–Craven Elec.
Membership Corp., 506 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] federal court should not create

95 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2017)

2017]

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN N.C.

1751

completely answer the questions posed by this Comment.
Nevertheless, persuasive federal cases present a particularly
illuminating exposition of the modern Corum doctrine not only
because they illustrate novel applications of the case law, but also
because they demonstrate the difficulties some courts have had in
grappling with this tenuous body of case law. Moreover, it is of note
that there has been more litigation of Corum and Craig issues in
federal courts lately than in North Carolina courts.102 While the exact
motivations of individual plaintiffs or defendants are not presumed
here, one potential explanation is that parties seeking to bring claims
under the North Carolina Constitution are likely to also bring claims
under the U.S. Constitution and thus have access to federal courts.103
Litigants have attempted to extend the Corum and Craig
guarantee of relief to new defenses, including the expiration of time
bars, such as statutes of limitations and repose. This extension is
premised upon the assertion that a claim time-barred by repose
precludes an adequate remedy.104 In one case, plaintiffs brought
federal civil rights claims and state causes of actions for alleged
constitutional violations which arose when police arrested the
plaintiff for possession of what ended up being sugar.105 In analyzing
the state law direct constitutional claims, the federal court noted that
the expiration of the statute of limitations does not render a remedy
or expand a State’s public policy [or] . . . elbow its way into [a] controversy to render what
may be an uncertain and ephemeral interpretation of state law.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (first quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 783
(4th Cir. 1995); and then quoting Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1992))).
102. See, e.g., Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22–23.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing for the recovery of damages for violations of
federal constitutional rights); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (listing removal provisions
for U.S. Constitution claims from state to federal court).
104. See Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22–23; CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134
S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014) (“A statute of repose ‘bar[s] any suit that is brought after a
specified time since the defendant acted . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has
suffered a resulting injury.’ ”) (quoting Statute of Repose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009)). Specifically in North Carolina, “[a] statute of repose creates an additional
element of the claim itself . . . .‘If the action is not brought within the specified period, the
plaintiff literally has no cause of action.’ ” Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 654–55, 447
S.E.2d 784, 787 (1994) (quoting Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 340–41, 368 S.E.2d
849, 857 (1988)). It should be noted here that in the federal system, “[i]n defining the
contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to
look first to the common law of torts” and “[i]n applying, selecting among, or adjusting
common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the
constitutional right at issue.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920–21 (2017). While
this does not help resolve the state law question at issue, it does show that federal courts
might have more leeway in adjudicating rules of accrual in similar federal claims.
105. See Haynes v. City of Durham, N.C., No. 1:12cv1090, 2016 WL 469608, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2016).
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inadequate under Craig.106 In a separate case, a teacher reported
accusations that a teaching aide had sexually assaulted a student; the
teacher who reported the accusations was subsequently not rehired
and proceeded to bring a wrongful discharge claim against school
officials and the board of education.107 In assessing the teacher’s
claim, a federal court found the teacher could have initiated an
administrative appeal; therefore, the plaintiff’s failure to timely file a
statutory administrative appeal, thus barring her claim, “d[id] not
render the statutory remedy inadequate.”108 Still other courts have
discovered ways to avoid these unresolved Corum questions,
dismissing plaintiffs’ claims on any alternative grounds they can
find.109

106. See id. at *7 n.17 (“[S]tate-law remedies are not rendered inadequate merely
because Plaintiffs failed to pursue them within the applicable statute of limitations.”).
107. J.W. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11-CV-707-D, 2012 WL 4425439, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2012).
108. Id. at *17.
109. See Randleman v. Johnson, 162 F. Supp. 3d 482, 490 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2016)
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for “fail[ing] to articulate the contours of North
Carolina case law”); Perry v. Pamlico Cty., 88 F. Supp. 3d 518, 536–37 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18,
2015) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff for her failure to “raise a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether defendants violated the law of the land clause in
the North Carolina Constitution” rather than “predict[ing] how the Supreme Court of
North Carolina would resolve this issue”). In general, “a federal court may, and ordinarily
should, refrain from deciding a case in which state action is challenged in federal court as
contrary to the federal constitution if there are unsettled questions of state law that may
be dispositive of the case and avoid the need for deciding the constitutional question.”
17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4242, at
320–21 (3d. ed. 2007). Such abstention in the circumstances discussed in this Comment
could, theoretically, allow a federal court to abstain from deciding a case involving both
state and federal constitutional issues when the state law is unclear, as it is in the Corum
doctrine. Moreover, there are other abstention doctrines that could similarly help federal
courts struggling with a vague Corum doctrine. See id. § 4241, at 298 (“Burford
[abstention] established that there are circumstances in which a federal court should
decline to hear at all a case of which it has jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict
with the states, but did not define what those circumstances are.”). Such decisions are
generally viewed as prudential and within the discretion of the court. Cf. Daniel J.
Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1908 (2004)
(“In the case of Pullman abstention, the district courts have been given a measure of
allocative discretion . . . the clear weight of authority establishes abuse of discretion as the
basic standard of review.”). Any orphic prognostications as to whether federal abstention
would preclude a plaintiff’s opportunity for relief implicates broad questions of federalism
that are beyond the scope of this Comment. Moreover, in cases brought in federal court
alleging state and federal law claims, an unanswered question remains as to whether a
federal claim that can proceed to the merits would constitute an adequate remedy.
Presumably the answer to this question is no, as Corum specifically discusses an “adequate
state remedy,” Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992)
(emphasis added), however it does not appear that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has squarely addressed this issue.
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Absent clear guidance from the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, federal courts in North Carolina must still address parties
litigating at the edges of the Corum doctrine. As recently as 2016,
parties contested aspects of Corum and Craig including the role of a
statute of repose as a barrier to recovery, the meaning of Craig’s
guarantee of access to the courthouse, whether Craig interacted
differently with substantive, rather than procedural, rights,110 and how
Corum extends to claims against defendants in their individual, rather
than governmental, capacities.111 As this recent litigation has shown,
the exact relationship between Corum and Craig and shielding
doctrines such as statues of limitations or repose is unclear. However,
the intersections between the Corum doctrine and traditional
shielding or defensive doctrines nonetheless provide an opportunity
to highlight differences in doctrinal strength, even if a “winner” is, as
of yet, unknown. It is therefore worthwhile to briefly analyze a recent
case, Grimes v. City of Hickory,112 as an example of how litigants have
argued that Corum and Craig can be used to sustain a claim which
would have otherwise been barred by the statute of repose.113
The point of contention in Grimes was, on the surface, relatively
straightforward: Grimes sought to recover damages for the years he
spent wrongfully imprisoned,114 while the defendants, the City of
Hickory, two police chiefs, and two detectives, argued that Grimes’
claim was time-barred by the statute of repose.115 Grimes, however,
argued that Corum and Craig guaranteed him the opportunity to
present his claim before a court.116 Specifically, he argued that “[i]f
[his] claims [were] barred by North Carolina’s statute of repose, he
‘literally [would have had] no cause of action’ ” and therefore would
have been afforded no adequate remedies for state constitutional

110. See Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22–23; Defendants’ Reply Brief in
Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 14, Grimes v. City of Hickory, No.
5:14-CV-00160-RLV (W.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016), ECF No. 79 [hereinafter Defs.’ Reply
Br.]. The district court in Grimes never decided the Corum and Craig issue, as the parties
settled prior to the district court ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
Notice of Settlement, Grimes, No. 5:14-CV-00160-RLV (Aug. 24, 2016), ECF No. 90.
111. Complaint, Grimes, No. 5:14-CV-00160-RLV (Oct. 8, 2014), ECF No. 1. See, e.g.,
Grimes Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 1. They also raise unique statutes of limitation
and repose issues because of the potentially very long time periods between any law
enforcement activity and civil cases arising from a finding of actual innocence. Id. at 22–23.
112. No. 5:14-cv-00160-RLV (W.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2014).
113. Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22–23.
114. Id. at 1–2
115. Defs.’ Reply Br., supra note 110, at 9–10.
116. Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22–23; see also Defs.’ Reply Br., supra
note 110, at 14.
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violations.117 The question thus became: in analyzing North Carolina
law, if a statute of repose bars a plaintiff’s claim regardless of when
she discovered her injury,118 can she subsequently be said to have had
an “opportunity to enter the courthouse doors”?119 And if she did not
have that opportunity, as guaranteed in Craig,120 can she be said to
have had the chance to exercise her rights to bring direct
constitutional claims as guaranteed by Corum?121
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s unequivocal statements
regarding both statutes of repose and direct constitutional claims are
thus forced into opposition in situations like that of Grimes. Once the
time period of the statute of repose expires, “the plaintiff ‘literally has
no cause of action. The harm that has been done is damnum absque
injuria—a wrong for which the law affords no redress.’ ”122 Moreover,
“repose serves as an unyielding and absolute barrier.”123 Such statutes
are a “substantive definition of rights rather than a procedural
limitation,”124 which reflect a long-standing policy of encouraging
diligence in litigation.125 These strong statements seem to indicate that
repose would prevail over the guarantee of the opportunity of a
plaintiff to present direct constitutional claims. Nevertheless, Corum
guaranteed plaintiffs an absolute opportunity to bring claims against
the state for constitutional violations, and Craig further guaranteed

117. Grimes’ Mem. in Opp’n, supra note 1, at 22 (first quoting Boudreau v. Baughman,
322 N.C. 331, 341, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1988); and then quoting Craig ex rel. Craig v. New
Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340, 678 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009)).
118. Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 655, 447 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1994) (“Regardless of
when plaintiffs’ claim might have accrued, or when plaintiffs might have discovered their
injury . . . their claim is not maintainable unless it was brought within [the time period of
the statute of repose].”); see also Trs. of Rowan Tech. Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs.,
Inc., 313 N.C. 230, 234 n.3, 328 S.E.2d 274, 276–77 n.3 (1985) (“Statutes of
repose . . . create time limitations which are not measured from the date of injury. These
time limitations often run from defendant’s last act giving rise to the claim.”). This
distinction from statutes of limitations is important. Where a party was aware of the injury
but did not promptly litigate their claim, it is much easier to say that that party had the
opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and simply neglected to take advantage of that
opportunity. Where the party was never aware of their claim, on the other hand, it is much
less straightforward to say that the party had their opportunity in court.
119. Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355.
120. See id.
121. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992).
122. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 787 (quoting Rosenberg v. Town of N.
Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972)).
123. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 633, 325 S.E.2d 469, 475 (1985).
124. Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 341, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1988).
125. See Ingram v. Smith, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 97, 102 (1849) (“[T]he obvious purpose
of our law is to insist peremptorily on diligence . . . not only in point of policy for the sake
of repose, but as an act of good faith.”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2017)

2017]

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN N.C.

1755

them the possibility of relief.126 As a result, a lower state court or
federal court facing such a dispute would be caught between the
proverbial rock and hard place. As has already been noted, such a
dispute is far from hypothetical: courts are already facing this
challenge and, as a result, are unable to clearly rule on matters of
constitutional rights.127
This friction demonstrates two things. First, that the Corum line
of cases has become a fairly ponderous doctrine, since it cannot be
definitively said that a supposedly “unyielding and absolute barrier”
would defeat a Corum claim, absent further guidance from the
Supreme Court of North Carolina.128 Second, the lack of a discernable
outcome—and its resulting uncertainty—highlights the increasing
necessity for the law to identify and provide a path forward.
III. HOW CORUM SHOULD BE UPDATED FOR THE MODERN DAY
On the one hand, like any developing doctrine, the status of
direct constitutional claims under the North Carolina Constitution
leaves much to be desired. Lower state and federal courts have been
left without clear guidance for too long. This Comment takes the
position that while “problematic” is perhaps too strong a word to
describe this doctrine, it is at the very least a precarious one.
However, the current state of the doctrine provides an opportunity to
reshape direct constitutional claims in North Carolina for the modern
era. The remainder of this Comment urges the Supreme Court of
North Carolina to refine this doctrine, within some delineated
contours. Specifically, the court should recognize the dichotomy
between substantive barriers, such as statutes of repose, and
procedural barriers, such as statutes of limitation, when analyzing
Corum claims. In doing so, North Carolina courts will have the
opportunity to extricate themselves from the morass that has become
this quasi-constitutional doctrine.
As previously described, the Corum doctrine has perhaps raised
more questions than it has answered. Although the constitution does
not directly impose upon the court a duty of legal clarity, unclear or
vague legal doctrines nonetheless interfere with an individual’s ability
to follow or utilize the law.129 It is therefore now appropriate for the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to reenter the fray and re-construe
126. See supra Sections I.B–C.
127. See supra Section I.D & Part II.
128. Black, 312 N.C. at 633, 325 S.E.2d at 475.
129. Cf. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 (1969) (“It is well settled
law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty.”).
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the laws and constitution of North Carolina.130 In attempting to
recommend a path forward for this doctrine, it is helpful to break the
analysis down into two parts: the prerequisites for a direct
constitutional claim and the guarantee of the possibility of relief.
A. Prerequisites for a Direct Constitutional Claim
In North Carolina, direct claims under the constitution can only
be brought when there is no adequate alternative remedy.131 As
discussed above, the doctrine of sovereign immunity means that such
an alternative remedy must generally be a statutorily created right of
action.132 This limitation is logical, in accord with traditional principles
of deference to statutory regimes,133 and similar to comparable
doctrines in other states.134 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has
long recognized the policymaking discretion of the General
Assembly.135 The requirement of no adequate alternative strikes a just
balance with that policy of deference. When the legislature has
allowed plaintiffs to recover through statutory enactments, such

130. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has explicitly acknowledged its authority in
this context, noting that “issues concerning the proper construction and application of
North Carolina laws and the Constitution of North Carolina can only be answered with
finality by this Court.” State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449–50, 385 S.E.2d
473, 479 (1989); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (2016) (listing the grounds for Supreme
Court of North Carolina grants of discretionary review). This final judicial authority is
even binding upon the U.S. Supreme Court, which lacks ultimate interpretive power over
state laws and constitutions. Cf. Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 610, 304
S.E.2d 164, 170 (1983).
131. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 784–85, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290–91 (1992).
132. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 167, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2004) (“[T]his
Court gives acts of the General Assembly great deference.” (quoting In re Spivey, 345
N.C. 404, 413, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (1997))).
134. See Jefferson, supra note 50, at 1543–44 nn.107–17 (collecting cases where “courts
have refused to create a direct cause of action for damage awards under a state
constitution because of the availability of alternative remedies”). Notably, some state
courts have allowed direct constitutional claims even where there are adequate nonconstitutional remedies. See, e.g., Widgeon v. E. Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 928–29
(Md. 1984) (“Thus, the existence of other available remedies, or lack thereof, is not a
persuasive basis for the resolution of the issue [of the existence of a direct constitutional
remedy].”).
135. See City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 105, 794 S.E.2d 759, 777 (2016) (“[O]ur
constitution . . . gives the General Assembly exceedingly broad authority.”); id. at 778–85
(Newby, J., dissenting) (chronicling and detailing the General Assembly’s “legislative
discretion” in policy decisions); McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231,
234 (1956) (“[T]he General Assembly is the policy-making agency of our government, and
when it elects to legislate . . . the statute supplants the common law rule and becomes the
public policy of the State in respect to that particular matter.”).
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enactments represent policy decisions of the state.136 In such cases, the
legislature has created a presumably adequate scheme for plaintiffs to
recover for injuries; allowing plaintiffs to circumvent that scheme
would be to, in effect, nullify an act of the legislature.137 Finally,
deferring to adequate alternative remedies furthers another
longstanding judicial canon: “the courts of [North Carolina] will avoid
constitutional questions . . . where a case may be resolved on other
grounds.”138 This canon serves, when possible, to give full effect to
acts of the people.139 As a result, such deference should be continued.
Furthermore, this deference will help to strike a delicate balance with
the judicial activism advocated for in the following section.
B.

The Possibility of Relief

As the above section shows, the first half of the Corum doctrine
is strong enough to survive a second look, but trouble arises in the
Craig guarantee of the “possibility of relief under the
circumstances.”140 More specifically, while Craig guaranteed plaintiffs
a right to bring direct constitutional claims,141 neither Craig nor
subsequent cases have clarified what exactly the possibility of relief
136. Cf. McMichael, 243 N.C. at 483, 91 S.E.2d at 234; see also D & W, Inc. v. City of
Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 591, 151 S.E.2d 241, 251 (1966) (“Only the General Assembly,
therefore, can establish the public policy of this State.”); Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347,
349, 196 S.E. 333, 334–35 (1938) (“[W]henever permissible, the courts will assume that the
Legislature intended its acts to be consonant with, and not violative of, existing public
policy and good morals.”); State v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192, 195, 136 S.E. 346, 347–48 (1927)
(“It can make no difference whether the judges, as individuals, think ill or well of the
manner in which the Legislature has dealt with a given subject, for, so long as the lawmaking body stays within the bounds of the Constitution, its acts are free from judicial
interference.”).
137. Cf. Greene v. Owen, 125 N.C. 212, 222, 34 S.E. 424, 427 (1899) (“[I]t is . . . our
duty to give full force and effect to [constitutional acts of the legislature].”); see also State
v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 645, 781 S.E.2d 248, 256 (2016) (“[Violations of the separation of
powers clause occur] when the actions of one branch prevent another branch from
performing its constitutional duties.”).
138. Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s authority to rule on constitutional questions is
incident to its authority to determine legal disputes between parties; therefore, as a
general matter, it resolves constitutional questions only when there is a need to determine
the superiority between conflicting rules of law (such as constitutional versus statutory
regimes). Nicholson v. State Educ. Assistance Auth., 275 N.C. 439, 447, 168 S.E.2d 401,
406 (1969).
139. See 27 JOHN KIMPFLEN, STRONG’S N.C. INDEX § 20, at 246 (4th ed. 2016) (“An
act of the people’s elected representatives is an act of the people and is presumed valid
unless it conflicts with the Constitution.”).
140. Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340, 678
S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009).
141. Id.
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looks like. The lingering question therefore involves what constitutes
such a possibility.
The answer to this question is informed by comparable doctrines
in other states.142 The fact that other states have been able to create
clear parameters around direct constitutional claims shows that there
is logical space for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to maneuver
in and examples to learn from or potentially follow. Maryland’s
highest court, for example, has recognized that “where an individual
is deprived [of certain state constitutional rights], he may enforce
those rights by bringing a common law action for damages.”143 While
slightly different from Corum and Craig, the Maryland case law is
sufficiently similar as to be illuminating. Only a few years after
adopting the initial reasoning, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
faced for the first time with the question of “whether a public official
should be entitled to qualified immunity” against constitutional
claims.144 After reviewing Maryland case law, the court concluded that
“an official who violates an individual’s rights under the Maryland
Constitution is not entitled to any immunity.”145
The Maryland court felt that granting qualified immunity would
render constitutional claims “an exercise in futility,” in that it would
simply create a right without a remedy.146 Such an interpretation
would “render nugatory the cause of action for violation of
constitutional rights.”147 The court specifically distinguished between
ordinary tort actions and constitutional actions by making it clear that
ordinary tort actions “protect one individual against another.”148 In
such situations, “governmental immunity . . . concern[s] whether, and
to what extent, as a policy matter, a government official or entity is
treated like an ordinary private party.”149 Constitutional actions, on
the other hand, “are specifically designed to protect citizens against
. . . government officials.”150 With direct constitutional claims,
affording immunity would be “inconsistent” with the very purpose of

142. At one time, more than twenty states recognized constitutional claims for
damages. Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State
Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 447 n.2 (1998).
143. Widgeon v. E. Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 930 (Md. 1984).
144. Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 541 A.2d 1303, 1311 (Md. 1988).
145. Id. at 1314.
146. Id. at 1312.
147. Id. at 1314.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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those constitutional provisions.151 This explanation is important for
two reasons: first, it demonstrates that courts can and have rejected
legislative limits on liability when necessary to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens; second, it demonstrates that
Maryland courts have not backed away from this analysis, proving
that such protections can be practically workable.152
The Maryland analysis should guide the Supreme Court of North
Carolina when assessing complete bars to litigation of constitutional
claims.153 It recognizes that when dealing with direct constitutional
claims, there are different considerations to take into account when
deciding to afford an immunity or defense. Maryland’s strong
protection of direct constitutional claims should serve as a guiding
light for North Carolina. Constitutional claims are different than
statutory or common law claims. Statutory claims in essence reflect
the creation of a cause of action by the legislature against the state.
Inherent in that legislative power is at least a limited power to curtail
and proscribe such grants of rights and associated claims.154 When the
legislature chooses to allow suits against the state under a statutory or
regulatory regime, it can also choose associated defenses or bars. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity limits common law claims against the
state as well. At common law the sovereign is only subject to suit
when the sovereign consents.155 Absent protection of constitutional
claims as granted in Corum,156 most suits cannot be brought without
specific legislative consent.157 As a result, sovereign immunity protects
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Espina v. Jackson, 112 A.3d 442, 455–56 (Md. 2015) (holding that the
family and estate of a shooting victim could bring constitutional violation claims against a
county officer, but that the state legislature could cap the damages amount); Prince
George’s Cty. v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859, 887–88 (Md. 2011) (affirming a jury’s damages
reward for a “pattern or practice of unconstitutional police conduct”); see also Dorwart v.
Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶¶ 53–61, 58 P.3d 128, 139–40 (Mont. 2002) (agreeing with the
Maryland court’s conclusion in Clea, but forbidding qualified immunity in constitutional
claims for other reasons). Other states have adopted the Widgeon analysis in part or in
whole. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 505 (Ind. 2006) (holding that a state
employee was shielded from constitutional claims to the extent a state statute provided
immunity); Moresi v. State, 567 So.2d 1081, 1092–93 (La. 1990) (concluding that an
individual may seek damages for state constitutional rights violations, but also recognizing
a good faith immunity for state officers).
153. Not only sovereign or qualified immunity, but also substantive barriers (such as
the statute of repose) may serve as a total bar to any litigation. See supra Part II.
154. Cf. Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 41–42, 497 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1998) (“It has
long been the established law of North Carolina that the State cannot be sued except with
its consent or upon its waiver of immunity.”).
155. See id.
156. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 786, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1992).
157. Whitfield, 348 N.C. at 41–42, 497 S.E.2d at 414.
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the state against common law claims, except when suit has been
legislatively authorized.158
Furthermore, common law and legislative doctrines are a way for
states to allocate resources, whereas constitutions are not. A historical
justification for sovereign immunity is that such immunity protects the
resources of the state.159 The process of republican government allows
the people, through their elected representatives, to choose how to
allocate the resources of the state.160 Private litigation of common law
claims against the state would circumvent that process.161 Claims
brought against the state would (and do) require the judiciary to
determine the allocation of some public funds; by awarding damages
to plaintiffs, courts are allocating the state’s resources to certain
citizens and not to others.162 When the legislature, and not the
judiciary, allocates resources, majoritarian rule and the separation of
powers is maintained.163 As James Madison noted in the Federalist
No. 10, “the public voice [is] pronounced by representatives of the
people.”164 Sovereign immunity prevents common law claims against
the state. While courts play an invaluable role in protecting the rights
of the minority, sovereign immunity limits the extent to which courts
can interfere with decisions of the majority.
In contrast, constitutional claims do not involve statutory
authorization for suit, nor do they involve the litigation of rights and
injuries between private parties. Constitutions, like Maryland’s or
North Carolina’s, specifically protect enumerated rights of the people
against acts of the government.165 North Carolina’s citizens are to be
free from government intrusion in their speech, their religious beliefs,
their right to assemble, and more.166 These rights are public rights,
158. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 460, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000).
159. Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,”
and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
765, 787–88 (2008).
160. N.C. CONST. art III, § 5(3) (“The Governor shall prepare and recommend to the
General Assembly a comprehensive budget.”); id. art. V, § 7(1) (“No money shall be
drawn from the State treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”).
161. For an enlightening explanation of “sovereign immunity as a democratic
safeguard,” see Florey, supra note 159 at 790–93.
162. See id. at 790.
163. Cf. id.; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages
Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 802–03
(2007); Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529,
1530 (1992) (“Much of sovereign immunity, however, derives . . . from a proper
commitment to majoritarian rule.”)
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed. 2008).
165. N.C. CONST. art I.
166. Id. art. I, §§ 12–14.
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given to all citizens; as a result, the justifications for limiting claims
against the state in statutory or common law suits are inapposite to
constitutional claims. Whereas the General Assembly can limit claims
against the state to conserve resources, any restriction of
constitutional rights must survive judicial scrutiny. If North Carolina
is going to continue to allow direct constitutional claims, creating total
bars to those claims would be, as noted by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, “inconsistent” with the very purpose of the constitutional
provisions.167 Moreover, a right without a remedy is meaningless;
complete bars on litigation would render constitutional claims
futile.168
Whereas the status quo of North Carolina direct constitutional
claims is murky, the supreme court should look to examples of clear
regimes (such as that of Maryland) in fashioning a better way
forward. What this should mean practically for future North Carolina
constitutional litigation is that in situations where immunities would
act as a complete bar on litigation, or where a substantive provision
such as the statute of repose would completely bar claims a plaintiff
never even had the opportunity to litigate, the plaintiff should have
the possibility of relief. Not only is this logically compelling (where
the plaintiff never had the opportunity to bring a claim, it cannot be
said she has the possibility of relief), but this conclusion is also
compelled by the policies and reasons discussed above. A claim
substantively barred by a statute of repose means that a plaintiff
would be completely precluded from recovery. Therefore, a plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed with a direct constitutional claim as a
way of not only having the possibility of relief but also as a way of
potentially vindicating important constitutional rights.
Quite simply, direct constitutional claims are just different.
Constitutional claims are a breed of their own, and have come to
serve as an important check on state and local governments.169 In
order to continue to serve an effective purpose, the guarantee of the
possibility of relief should be extended to litigation which otherwise
would be completely barred, allowing the plaintiff who would
otherwise be left outside the courthouse door the opportunity to
come in and present her claim.
167. Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 541 A.2d 1303, 1314 (Md. 1988).
168. Indeed, the right of injured parties to “apply[] to the courts” for a “remedy by the
course of law” has been recognized since before this country and this state’s
independence. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141.
169. Brennan, supra note 66, at 495 (explaining that state constitutions can guarantee
more protection of citizens’ rights than federal constitutional provisions).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2017)

1762

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

What this Comment proposes is a dichotomy between
substantive and procedural (or perhaps better thought of as
unyielding and yielding) barriers to recovery. Unsurprisingly,
resolving situations when defenses do not serve as unyielding barriers
to litigation is easier and requires less discussion. For example,
statutes of limitation can bar litigation, but do not serve as complete
bars. Typically, the accrual of the limitations period begins “when the
plaintiff is injured or discovers he or she has been injured.”170 Unlike
qualified immunity or statutes of repose, which can bar claims
regardless of any action by the plaintiff, statutes of limitations allow
the plaintiff the opportunity to litigate his claim.171 They are intended
not to vitiate or circumscribe liability, but instead to simply “require
diligent prosecution of known claims.”172 A claim barred by the
expiration of the statute of limitations does not mean that the plaintiff
has no possibility of relief; rather, it means that the plaintiff
squandered that ability. Unlike the doctrines discussed above, which
per se reduce or remove entirely a plaintiff’s ability to hold the state
responsible for violations of their rights, doctrines such as the statute
of limitations, contributory negligence, and res judicata only limit the
state’s liability as a result of the plaintiff’s actions.
Moreover, whereas the statute of repose is a substantive
limitation, statutes of limitation are procedural rules.173 Statutes of
limitation are enforced subject to equitable considerations174 and do
not define rights or injuries.175 Statutes of repose, on the other hand,
“are intended to mitigate . . . potentially limitless legal exposure.”176
While statutes of limitations “promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until

170. Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc., 367 N.C. 534, 538, 766 S.E.2d 282, 286 (2014).
171. Id. (highlighting that statutes of limitations only limit those claims brought outside
of the limitation period and that furthermore, the “enforceability [of statutes of
limitations] is subject to equitable defenses”).
172. Id. (quoting Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Nowell v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889,
891 (1959)).
175. Cf. Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 366–67, 293 S.E.2d 415, 417–18
(1982); see also id. at 366 n.3, 293 S.E.2d at 417 n.3 (noting that the term “statute of
repose” historically encompassed “statute of limitation” before practitioners began
differentiating between the terms).
176. Christie, 367 N.C. at 539, 766 S.E.2d at 287.
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evidence has been lost,”177 statutes of repose “provide a fresh start or
freedom from liability” entirely.178
This difference will ultimately prove to be a worthwhile guide for
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in future litigation. Substantive
bars to recovery, whether the result of duly enacted legislation by the
General Assembly or a product of the common law, should in effect
be subsumed by direct constitutional claims. The North Carolina
Constitution is the supreme law of North Carolina, and is superior to
other laws of the state.179 At common law, the sovereign could not be
sued, as the courts were mere instrumentalities of the sovereign.180
Nevertheless, the constitution binds the sovereign181 and it is the role
of the state courts to pass on matters of constitutionality.182 As such,
constitutional claims should not be constrained by substantive
doctrines which are, by definition, inferior.183
On the other hand, procedural rules and doctrines do not
interact in the same manner; they do not purport to constrain
constitutional rights, but instead guide litigation.184 They do not
preclude litigation and recovery; they simply govern the procedures

177. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49
(1944).
178. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014).
179. Cf. S. Ry. Co. v. Cherokee Cty., 177 N.C. 87, 88, 97 S.E. 758, 759 (1919) (“[T]he
courts [of North Carolina must] sustain the will of the people as expressed in the
Constitution.”).
180. N.C. Dept. of Transp. v. Davenport, 334 N.C. 428, 431, 432 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1993).
181. S. Ry., 177 N.C. at 88, 97 S.E. at 759 (“The Constitution is the supreme law . . . .
[It] is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of
government.”); State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 662, 4 S.E. 350, 351 (1887) (“[W]hen the
constitution prescribes and directs . . . [the powers of government], such direction cannot
be disregarded.”).
182. S. Ry., 177 N.C. at 88, 97 S.E. at 759 (“[I]t is not only within the power, but . . . it is
the duty, of the courts in proper cases to declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional,
and this obligation arises from the duty imposed on the courts to declare what the law
is.”).
183. A counter-argument should be noted here. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said,
“[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent . . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan
of the [constitutional] convention, it will remain with the States.” Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Lawrence Goldman ed. 2008)). As a result, the authority of any court, even the North
Carolina Supreme Court, to abrogate or limit sovereign immunity is at least open to
question. However, because Corum purported to specifically limit sovereign immunity,
supra text accompanying notes 47–54, the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s authority is
assumed in this Comment. Furthermore, while Hans was ostensibly premised in the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 134 U.S. at 15, 18, the North Carolina
Constitution (logically) does not have a corresponding provision.
184. Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 718, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980).
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by which such litigation and recovery work. A plaintiff’s own actions,
not the actions of the state, ultimately trigger the bar. Therefore, in
trying to identify what the contours of the Corum doctrine should be,
where claims would be completely barred by a substantive doctrine, it
should be held that the possibility of relief does not exist. In contrast,
where the plaintiff has had the opportunity for relief and is barred
procedurally as a result of his or her own actions, it is straightforward
to say that the plaintiff had the appropriate opportunity to relief.
C.

Corum, Modified.

The final task is to elucidate what exactly this Comment
recommends to North Carolina courts in future litigation, using the
points discussed above. First, a significant portion of the extant
doctrine deserves to be continued. The court should defer to the
legislature when doing so would be equitable; in other words, the
court should yield to already established non-constitutional claims
(such as a statutory right of action allowing recovery for
constitutional violations), which would allow the plaintiff adequate
relief. This policy of judicial restraint and discretion would allow
plaintiffs the opportunity to be compensated for injuries, while also
deferring to the common law or legislative judgments.
This policy of prudence is also important when it comes to the
second suggestion: that the supremacy of the North Carolina
Constitution dictates that direct constitutional claims prevail over
traditional substantive legal hurdles, that claims substantively barred
at state law are inadequate, and that plaintiffs should thus be allowed
to bring direct constitutional claims. Because of the primacy of the
constitution, constitutional claims should not be subject to traditional
substantive barriers to recovery. True, substantive bars can bar claims
at common or statutory law; however, these bars should not be
allowed to completely preclude litigation. When claims at state law
are substantively barred, the plaintiff is without an adequate remedy
and should be allowed to bring alternative constitutional claims. The
sovereign is bound by the constitution and by the court’s
interpretation of constitutional matters.185 When substantive doctrines
circumscribe claims at state law, plaintiffs are left without an
adequate remedy and should be allowed to present direct
constitutional claims against the state. Such a rule would fulfill Craig’s
guarantee of access to the courthouse.

185. See S. Ry., 177 N.C. at 88, 97 S.E. at 759.
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This proposal should not be interpreted as subjecting the state to
unending liability. Unlike substantive doctrines, procedural matters
do not abridge or define rights.186 Res judicata or statutes of limitation
serve to encourage due diligence in litigation,187 and not to define
liability. Any resulting limitations of claims would not be due to the
sovereign defining liability, but would rather be the result of the
plaintiff failing to diligently vindicate his or her rights.188 Therefore,
under the Corum doctrine, a plaintiff whose claims are procedurally
barred had an adequate remedy at state law and should not in the
alternative be allowed to bring a direct constitutional claim.
Moreover, Corum and its progeny, as well as this Comment, focus on
remedies, not recovery. As judges have noted, “a remedy is not
synonymous with actual recovery”—a remedy is only the “possibility
of relief under the circumstances.”189 This proposal is not synonymous
with increased recovery for plaintiffs; rather, it advocates for
increased opportunities to present constitutional claims—recovery
will still depend on the merits.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has identified the elements of a direct
constitutional claim in North Carolina. Then, taking the elements in
turn, it has not only identified the contours of such a claim, but it has
also suggested ways in which the doctrine can be modified and
strengthened. As has been demonstrated, the body of law created by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Midgett, expanded in Corum,
and modified in Craig, remains to this day a powerful tool of
litigation. It furthers the central goal of North Carolina’s
Constitution—to secure the rights of all persons.190 This powerful
doctrine, however, has been obfuscated over time, dulling the once
bright constitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, Corum and its progeny
retain their value to this day, remaining the subject of litigation and
186. Gardner, 300 N.C. at 718, 268 S.E.2d at 471.
187. Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc., 367 N.C. 534, 538, 766 S.E.2d 282, 286 (2014)
(statute of limitations); Bockweg v. Anderson; 333 N.C. 486, 498, 428 N.C. 157, 165 (1993)
(res judicata and collateral estoppel).
188. Cf. Nowell v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891
(1959) (explaining that statutes of limitation operate as defenses not based on any “lack of
merit”).
189. Edwards v. City of Concord, 827 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (quoting
Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340, 678 S.E.2d 351,
355 (2009)).
190. N.C. CONST. pmbl.; Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290
(1992) (“The fundamental purpose for [the constitution] was to provide citizens with
protection from the State’s encroachment upon [their rights].”).
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dispute. It is this very relevance that calls for supreme court action.
By ensuring the primacy of the constitution while also recognizing the
importance of procedural rules, it is possible to reshape the Corum
doctrine for the modern era. Nearly forty years ago, Justice William
Brennan recognized that state constitutions “are a font of individual
liberties.”191 By readdressing this doctrine, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina can ensure the protection of individual liberties in the
future.
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